Aristotle's Response to Chrysippus' Dog: Aristotle on Non-Human Animal Thought

Joseph Karbowski

A recent trend in current philosophical and psychological research on non-human animal cognition appeals to the idea that thinking/thought has different representational formats (in different species and, perhaps, even one and the same species). There is, of course, propositional thought, which linguistically capable creatures (like us) can exhibit, because it takes place in a language-like medium. But many current researchers on animal cognition also think that at least some animals incapable of language think, though their thought is non-propositional and takes place in a different kind of representational medium, e.g. in mental images, diagrams, and/or maps. In this paper, I trace the origins of this trend all the way back to Aristotle. In particular, I argue (1) that Aristotle believes that some non-human animals exhibit a genuine kind of thought/thinking and (2) that their thinking has a qualitatively different kind of representational format from that of human thought. Briefly, non-human animal thought is wholly imagistic, whereas human thought is propositional. In the course of articulating and defending these theses I explain how Aristotle would respond to Chrysippus' famous story about the dog at the triple fork in the road, and I conclude by sketching their implications for Aristotle's view of the relation between rationality and thought/thinking.